Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc. by Foley, James R.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician
Computer Network, Inc.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration can be described as a process that leads to the efficient
resolution of disputes without resort to the time and expense of litigation.
Nevertheless, there are occasions when a party to a given dispute may feel
that the dispute requires litigation. When such a party is determined to
avoid arbitration, a federal district court may be required to ascertain
whether an arbitration clause contained in an agreement between or among
the involved parties requires that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. 1
The party favoring arbitration may seek appellate review of an adverse
arbitrability determination; this party may also move to stay the litigation in
the district court pending the appeal. 2
For many years, the appealability of an arbitrabiity determination was
controlled by a convoluted web of federal appellate jurisprudence known as
the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine.3 Loosely based on the old distinctions
between law and equity, the doctrine was ultimately rejected by the
Supreme Court in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.4 In
1988, shortly after the Gulfstream decision, Congress amended the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) to provide a statutory basis for determining the
* 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997).
1 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides for motions to stay litigation
pending arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994), as well as motions to compel parties to
submit to arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
2 The scenario may be played out in reverse, in which a party resisting arbitration
may ask that an arbitration be stayed pending appeal of a determination in favor of
arbitration. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B.
3 See generally 16 CHIALEs ALAN WiuGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 3923, at 132-137 (2d ed. 1996); Olsen v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986); Pamela Mathy, The Appealability of District
Court Orders Staying Court Proceedings Pending Arbitration, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 31
(1979). The doctrine draws its name from the first two cases to invoke it, Enelow v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. .379 (1935), and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
4 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
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appealability of arbitrability determinations made in federal courts. 5 As a
result, § 16 of the FAA6 generally denies an immediate appeal from
arbitrability determinations favoring arbitration and allows an immediate
appeal from determinations adverse to arbitration. 7 Notably, the statute
5 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100--702,
§ 1019(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670-4671 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16
(1994)). Originally numbered § 15, the section was renumbered § 16 by the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 325(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5089, 5120.
See 9 U.S.C.A § 16, David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, Appeals for Arbitrability
Determinations, at 376 (West Supp. 1998).
6 The statute provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from-
(1) an order-
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order
arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel
arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial
award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an
injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this
title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may
not be taken from an interlocutory order-
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
7 See id. It should be noted that, while it may have been Congress's intention to
provide a clearly pro-arbitration framework for determining appealability of arbitration
determinations, the drafters of § 16 left a loophole. Section 16(a)(3) provides for the
immediate appeal of a "final decision with respect to an arbitration." Id. § 16(a)(3). If
the only issue before the district court is the arbitrability of a particular dispute, then a
decision either way can be construed as a "final decision." Consequently, even a
decision in favor of arbitration can be immediately appealed, thus frustrating the
obvious intent of Congress to streamline the progress of cases into arbitration. For a
more thorough discussion of this problem, and a suggested solution, see Siegel, supra
note 5, at 377-379. The issue of the appealability of arbitrability determinations is
distinct from the issue of stays pending appeal of those determinations, and this Note is
only concerned with the latter. For more thorough examinations of the appealability
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does not address the issue of whether a stay of proceedings in the district
court may be obtained pending an appeal of a determination against
arbitration. 8
In Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network,
Inc.,9 the Seventh Circuit addressed this specific issue, granting a stay of
proceedings to a party appealing a district court's determination that a
contractual dispute was not subject to arbitration.10
Circuit opinions on this subject are quite rare, and Judge Frank
Easterbrook's Bradford-Scott opinion is remarkable in its approach to the
issue. An overview of the facts and procedural history of the case follows
in Part II of this Note. Part III briefly outlines the usual path to obtaining a
stay pending appeal and discusses the Seventh Circuit's prior hostility to
requests for stays of arbitration pending the appeal of determinations
favorable to arbitration. Part IV discusses Judge Easterbrook's disposition
of the stay issue in Bradford-Scott and examines the conflict that his
approach creates between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits concerning the
ability of a district court to proceed with a case after the appeal of a
determination adverse to arbitration. Part V concludes that the Seventh
Circuit's framework for assessing stays pending appeal of arbitrability
determinations-completed by Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Bradford-
Scott-is ultimately consistent with the pro-arbitration philosophy currently
in vogue in the federal courts.
II. BRADFORD-SCOT: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bradford-Scott Data Corporation (Bradford-Scott) entered into an
agreement with VERSYSS Inc. (VERSYSS) to redistribute software
produced by VERSYSS. 11 In 1988, the parties executed a Vertical Value
issue, see 15B CHARLEs ALAN WRiGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3914.17 (2d. ed. 1992); Edith Jones, Appeals of Arbitration Orders- Coming Out Of
the Serbonian Bog, 31 S. T hx. L. REv. 361 (1990); William G. Phelps, Appealability
of Order Staying, or Refusing to Stay, Proceeding in Federal District Court Pending
Arbitration Procedure, 110 A.L.R. Fed. 148 (1992).
8 See C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufidn & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Tenn. 1989).
9 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997).
10 See id. at 507.
11 See id. at 504.
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Added Reseller Agreement (VAR)12 and in 1993 executed a Master License
Agreement (MLA). 13 According to the complaint filed by Bradford-Scott,
Physician's Computer Network, Inc. (PCN) subsequently acquired
VERSYSS. 14 PCN sold a software package in competition with the package
licensed from VERSYSS by Bradford-Scott; eventually, Bradford-Scott
brought suit against VERSYSS and PCN alleging breach of contract and
seeking damages and injunctive relief. 15
PCN and VERSYSS filed a motion pursuant to § 3 of the FAA 16
seeking to stay the proceedings in the district court pending arbitration of
the breach of contract claims. The court held that, since the claims that
Bradford-Scott asserted arose out of the 1993 MLA, and not the 1988
VAR, the narrow arbitration clause in the 1993 MLA would determine the
arbitrability of those claims. The court concluded that the 1993 clause did
not cover the claims; therefore; the claims were not arbitrable, and the
court refused to stay discovery and trial pursuant to § 3.17
PCN and VERSYSS immediately appealed the arbitrability
determination to the Seventh Circuit, and requested that the district court
issue a stay of its proceedings pending appeal of the arbitrability issue. The
district court refused to issue a stay pending appeal because, in its opinion,
the order refusing to issue a stay pursuant to § 3 was not an appealable
order. 18 PCN and VERSYSS subsequently requested a stay pending appeal
12 See id.; see also Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network,
Inc., 136 F.3d 1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Bradford-Scott I1]. The 1988
agreement was actually between Bradford-Scott and Contel Business Systems, a
predecessor entity of VERSYSS. See id. at 1157-1158.
13 See id. at 1157.
14 See id.
15 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
16 Section 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,
providing that the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
17 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
18 See id.
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from the Seventh Circuit; this request was granted, 19 and its resolution is
discussed below.20 Ultimately, a different panel of the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court's determination that the dispute was not subject to
arbitration. 21
III. STAYS PENDING APPEAL AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Stays Pending Appeal: The Four-Prong Test
Merely filing an appeal does not operate to stay the enforcement of a
lower court's judgment. To obtain such relief, a party must secure a stay
pending appeal of the lower court's ruling. 22 This request is normally made
in the first instance to the district court that issued the ruling. 23 If the
request for stay is denied, the party may then ask the appellate court for the
same relief.24 When evaluating a request for a stay pending appeal, both
district and appellate courts have looked to a four-prong test given the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Braunskill.25
The components of the test are as follows: (1) Has the stay applicant
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal; (2) Will the stay
applicant be irreparably harmed by a refusal to grant the stay; (3) Will the
issuance of the stay substantially injure the other interested parties to the
proceeding; and (4) Does the public interest favor the issuance of a stay?26
19 See id. PCN and VERSYSS appealed the § 3 determination pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). Judge Easterbrook's opinion granting the stay pending appeal
described as "untenable" the district court's determination that the order it had entered
was unappealable. See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See Bradford-Scott I1, 136 F.3d at 1158. On the issue of arbitrability, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and added that the 1993 MLA
contained a clause stating that any conflicts between the 1988 and 1993 agreements
would be controlled by the 1993 MLA. See id. The court noted that VERSYSS had, in
fact, rejected a broader arbitration clause and had itself proposed the narrow clause
ultimately incorporated into the 1993 agreement. See id.
22 See 16A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
§ 3954, at 282 (2d ed. 1996).
23 See generally FED. R. App. PRoc. 8(a).
24 Seeid.; see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3954, at 282.
25 481 U.S. 770 (1986). See 16A WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 22, § 3954, at 284
n.7.
26 See Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
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Different circuits have applied this test in a variety of ways. Some stress the
likelihood of success on the merits as the predominant prong, while others
allow a strong showing on one prong to compensate for a weak showing on
other prongs. 27 This test is widely applied, and is not confined to questions
of stay pending appeal of arbitrability determinations.28 In recent years,
however, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an almost irrebuttable
presumption that the irreparable harm prong cannot be met by parties
seeking to stay an arbitration pending appeal of a determination favoring
arbitration. 29 In contrast to this presumption, the Bradford-Scott opinion
adopts an almost automatic grant of a stay of litigation pending appeal of a
determination adverse to arbitration. 30
B. The Seventh Circuit and Stays of Arbitration
In Graphic Communications Union v. Chicago Tribune Co., 31 the
Seventh Circuit established a nearly irrebuttable presumption that parties
requesting a stay of arbitration will be unable to satisfy the irreparable harm
prong. The defendant publishing company requested a stay of arbitration
pending its appeal of an order to arbitrate a labor dispute with the union. 32
The court alluded to the operation of the Hilton test, holding that a
likelihood of success on the merits was a "necessary but not sufficient"
condition for granting a stay pending appeal. 33 Judge Richard Posner noted
that the irreparable harm prong must also be satisfied, and in the context of
a request to stay an arbitration, Judge Posner found it "very difficult to
imagine" a case in which this prong could be satisfied. 34 The costs of
arbitration could never be considered "irreparable"; consequently, a
27 See generally John Y. Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate
Stays, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 809 (1993).
28 See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 3954.
29 See Independent Lift Truck Builders Union v. Hyster Co., 803 F. Supp. 1374,
1375 (C.D. IUl. 1992) (applying this presumption to a request for a stay of arbitration).
30 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
31 779 F.2d 13 (7th Cir. 1985).
32 See id. at 15.
33 See id.
34 Id. Indeed, Judge Posner began the opinion by stating that "[n]ot only has the
request for a stay [of arbitration] no merit but the whole class of requests that it
illustrates has no merit, a point we wish to emphasize in order to discourage the making
of such requests in the future." Id. at 14.
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request to stay arbitration would inevitably fail the test for obtaining a
stay. 35 Admitting the possibility of the "extraordinarily rare" case that
might warrant a stay of arbitration, the court nevertheless warned future
applicants that it would not hesitate to level sanctions against parties making
reflexive requests for stays in run-of-the-mill cases. 36
The Seventh Circuit's threat to assess sanctions was not an empty one;
in cases decided six weeks apart, the Circuit twice charged the cost of
responding to a request for a stay of arbitration to parties resisting
arbitration. 37 In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Farnham,38 Judge Easterbrook
emphasized the almost unattainable nature of a stay of arbitration by noting
that, in the Graphic Communications case, the issue of arbitrability was
eventually decided in favor of the party seeking the stay of arbitration. 39
Nevertheless, Judge Easterbrook remarked, this only makes clear the point
that, even when success on the merits is likely, the inability to show
irreparable harm will almost always doom a request for a stay of
arbitration.40 Judge Easterbrook assessed sanctions, noting that " [ l]itigants
must think twice before filing papers that put their adversaries to expense;
they must think three times before filing in arbitration cases; there is no
evidence that PaineWebber thought even once before seeking a stay pending
appeal."41
The Seventh Circuit's position in the case of a request to stay
arbitration is predicated on a failure to show irreparable harm. The position
assumed in Bradford-Scott in regard to a request to stay litigation is
predicated on a much different disability-a lack of jurisdiction to proceed
in the district court.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 16.
37 See PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1988); Classic
Components Supply, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc., 841 F.2d 163, 166 (7th Cir.
1988).
38 843 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1988).
39 See PaineWebber, 843 F.2d at 1052 (citing Graphic Communications Union v.
Chicago Tribune Co., 794 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1986)).
40 See PaineWebber, 843 F.2d at 1052.
41 Id. at 1053.
1077
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IV. BRADFORD-SCOTT AND CREATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
A. Dismissal Of The Four-Prong Test
The Bradford-Scott defendants applied to the Seventh Circuit for a stay
pending appeal after the district court rejected their request for that relief.42
Judge Easterbrook quickly dismissed as "untenable" the lower court's
reasoning for denying a stay pending appeal of the arbitrability
determination. 43 The lower court determined that the order it had entered
denying arbitrability was unappealable and therefore a stay of the trial
pending appeal should not issue; Judge Easterbrook noted that § 16(a)(1)(A)
of the FAA provides for appeals of this type. 44 The postures assumed by
the parties arguing the stay request were similarly rejected:
For their part, the parties have approached the issue as if appellants were
seeking a stay of an injunction, rather than a delay in proceedings. To
obtain a stay of a district court's judgment, the appellant must establish
irreparable harm and a significant probability of success on the merits,
against a background norm that appellate courts are reluctant to disturb
decisions in advance of full review4 5
This reference to the parties' apparent briefing of the four-prong test
(which is, in fact, also used to evaluate requests for stays of injunctions)46
was followed by a quick dismissal of appellant's chances of success on that
standard. Judge Easterbrook opined that the costs of litigation cannot
constitute irreparable harm; therefore, appellants' request for a stay would
"fail at the outset." 47 This appears to be entirely consistent with the
Seventh Circuit's irrebuttable presumption standard; however, Judge
Easterbrook then considered the issue from an entirely different
perspective, asking "not whether appellants have shown a powerful reason
why the district court must halt proceedings, but whether there is any good
reason why the district court may carry on once an appeal has been
4 2 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 Id.
46 See 11 CHARLEs ALAN WRGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 2904, at 501-503 (2d ed. 1995).
47 Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
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filed." 48 Adopting this perspective, the Seventh Circuit established an
almost automatic stay upon the filing of an appeal of an arbitrability
determination adverse to arbitration. 49
B. Divestiture of Jurisdiction as the Basis for an Automatic Stay
Judge Easterbrook's basic position is that the district court is divested
of jurisdiction to proceed when an appeal is filed under § 16(a) of the
FAA. 50 Once that premise is established, the evaluation of a request for
stay pending appeal becomes more simple, as the district court can hardly
continue proceedings without jurisdiction over the case. Judge Easterbrook
relied on an axiomatic proposition to support his position: the filing of an
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal. 51 It is Judge Easterbrook's contention that what is
"involved" in an arbitrability appeal-at least when the district court's
determination is adverse to arbitration-is the very question of whether the
district court can proceed with the case. Judge Easterbrook stated that
continuing the proceedings in the lower court "largely defeats the point of
the appeal." 52
Judge Easterbrook also noted the loss of the movant's "benefit of the
bargain" if the movant is forced to go through a trial only to prevail on the
arbitrability issue at the appellate level and then have to go through
arbitration. 53 Judge Easterbrook perceived a situation where a party would
be put to the cost of both arbitration and litigation;54 to ground his decision
48Id.
49 See id. at 506.
50 See id. at 505. "Divestiture of jurisdiction" is perhaps a misnomer. The district
court is surely not entirely without involvement in the case while an appeal is pending.
See, e.g., Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of IM., 123 F.3d 427, 428 (7th
Cir. 1997) (noting that an appeal may endow both the district and appellate courts with
"authority over discrete portions of the case"). In this context, divestiture of
jurisdiction simply means that the district court is divested of its ability to move
forward with the process of preparing for and conducting a trial on the merits. See
Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 507; see also Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335, 1337-
1338 (7th Cir. 1989).
51 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer
Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).
52 See id.
53 See id. at 506.
54 See id.
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in that observation would be to concede, at least implicitly, that the costs of
litigation-both financial and strategic-would in essence constitute
irreparable harm.55 Therefore, Judge Easterbrook's actual holding is
grounded solely on the divestiture of jurisdiction argument. 56
Bradford-Scott completed the Seventh Circuit's creation of an almost
per se framework for evaluating stays pending appeal from determinations
of arbitrability. With language remarkably similar to that used by Judge
Posner in Graphic Communications,57 Judge Easterbrook stated that
"similar requests" to the Circuit for stays in the future should be
"unnecessary." 58 The implication is that, when a request is made for a stay
of trial pending appeal of a determination adverse to arbitration, the relief
should automatically be granted by the district court in the first instance.
However, Judge Easterbrook's reliance on a divestiture of jurisdiction
argument to support his creation of the automatic stay places the Seventh
Circuit in conflict with a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit, Britton v. Co-
op Banking Group.59
C. Judge Easterbrook v. The Ninth Circuit: Britton v. Co-op Banking
Group and the Frivolity Loophole
In Britton, the defendant in a securities fraud case asserted a position
similar to that assumed by Judge Easterbrook in Bradford-Scott.60 The
defendant argued that because he had appealed the district court's denial of
his motion to compel arbitration, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter a default judgment against him for failure to comply with requests for
discovery. 61 The Ninth Circuit panel handling the arbitrability appeal
rejected this argument,62 opining that the issue of arbitrability was
55 C C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec.
Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 310 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (stating "this Court finds the time
and expense of litigation to constitute irreparable harm in this instance").
56 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
57 See supra note 34.
58 Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
59 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990).
60 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61 See Britton, 916 F.2d at 1411 ("[Defendant] relies upon the general rule that the
filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction and transfers
jurisdiction to the appellate court.").
62 See id.
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completely severable from the merits of the underlying dispute. 63
Consequently, there was no reason that the district court could not proceed
with the case while the issue of arbitrability was on appeal. 64 The Ninth
Circuit panel also felt that to allow such a proposition to stand would permit
"crafty litigants" 65 to frustrate the progress of cases in the district court
through frivolous appeals of arbitrability determinations. 66
Judge Easterbrook dealt with each of the Ninth Circuit's objections to
the loss of jurisdiction argument in turn. As to the claim that arbitrability is
an issue severable from the merits, Judge Easterbrook conceded the point
as a valid premise but countered that the conclusion does not follow. 67 The
severable nature of the arbitrability issue does not dictate that the ability of
the district court to proceed on the merits is unaffected by the arbitrability
appeal. Judge Easterbrook analogized the appeal of arbitrability to an
appeal asserting a double jeopardy defense; 68 to an appeal asserting an
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense;69 and to an appeal asserting a
qualified immunity defense. 70 In each case, the issue on appeal is
dispositive of whether the case can be heard in the district court. Therefore,
according to Judge Easterbrook, in each case it is inappropriate for the
63 See id. The Ninth Circuit's position turned on exactly the same phrase as Judge
Easterbrook's-matters "involved in the appeal." Id.
64 See id. at 1412.
65 This is actually Judge Easterbrook's term. See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
66 See Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412. The Britton court also claimed that the FAA
created a "system" for the district courts to "evaluate the merits of [a] movant's claim"
and decide if a stay is appropriate. Id. This is unsupported by the statutory language
and directly contradicted by one of the two cases cited by the Britton court as support
for this assertion. See supra note 6; see also C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette See. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Term. 1989)
(noting that § 16 does not address the issue of a stay pending appeal). The "system"
used by those cited courts was, in fact, the four-prong test from Hilton. See Pearce v.
E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (implying the use of the
Hilton test by the district court to grant stay of litigation pending an appeal of
arbitrability); C.B.S. Employees, 716 F. Supp. at 309 (applying the Hilton test to arrive
at a decision to grant stay of litigation pending appeal of arbitrability).
67 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
68 See id. (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)).
69 See id. (citing Goshtasby v. University of II., 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997)).
70 See id. (citing Apostol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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district court to soldier on while the dispositive issue is on appeal. 71
In each case, however, the district court need not abstain if the appeal
of the issue is frivolous. 72 This meets the second objection raised by the
Ninth Circuit in Britton regarding crafty litigants filing frivolous appeals to
impede the progress of litigation. 73 Judge Easterbrook noted that the
plaintiffs in Bradford-Scott did not argue that the appeal of arbitrability was
frivolous, nor did the plaintiffs assert that any of the individual claims
against the defendants were "clearly non-arbitrable" 74 (and therefore, by
implication, frivolous as the basis of an arbitrability appeal). Indeed, after
Bradford-Scott, frivolity of the arbitrability appeal now arguably stands as
the only reason a district court in the Seventh Circuit may refuse to issue a
stay pending a § 16(a) appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Easterbrook's creation of an automatic stay pending appeal of an
anti-arbitrability determination, combined with the Seventh Circuit's
adoption of an almost irrebuttable presumption against a stay pending
appeal of a pro-arbitrability determination, completes the Seventh Circuit
framework for evaluation of stays pending appeal of arbitrability. This
framework is ultimately consistent with the predominant federal policy
favoring arbitration. Specifically, the stay framework accomplishes-
without readily apparent loopholes-what § 16 of the FAA tried to
accomplish with respect to the appealability of arbitration determinations.
The framework clearly favors arbitration and the movement of cases into
arbitration without unnecessary delay. This is exactly what Congress
intended through its adoption of § 16 of the FAA.75
While the first half of the Seventh Circuit's framework remains at least
arguably grounded in the pre-existing four-prong test, Judge Easterbrook's
creation of the automatic stay stands without direct reference to statutory
71 See id.; see also Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1338 ("It makes no sense for trial to go
forward while the court of appeals cogitates on whether there should be one.").
72 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506. If the appeal is frivolous, either the district
court or the appellate court can so declare, and the district court can then move ahead
with the case. See id. A finding of frivolity by the district court can be reviewed by the
appellate court. See Apostol, 870 F.2d at 1339.
73 See Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412.
74 See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506.
75 See Siegel, supra note 5, at 376.
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authority; indeed, it is largely the result of Judge Easterbrook's
interpretation of the phrase "involved in the appeal." But this should be
troubling to no one-in the course of Judge Easterbrook's discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Britton, it becomes apparent that the position
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott is the more logical
position.
The assertion that, as a philosophical matter, the issue of arbitrability
can be easily severed from the merits of a given dispute does not lead
inexorably to the conclusion that a district court can continue to adjudicate
the merits of a case while a court of appeals decides whether the district
court is even the proper forum in which to proceed. On the contrary, when
the question on appeal is arbitrability and a federal statute requires that
arbitrable disputes be referred to arbitration upon proper demand, it cannot
be said that the issue of the district court's power to proceed is not
"involved in the appeal." The case for the automatic stay appears strong.
The overall stay framework seems to be consistent with current federal
policy in the areas of arbitration and appealability. It remains to be seen
whether the Seventh Circuit's approach will prompt reexamination of the
traditional four-prong test by the other circuits.
James R. Foley
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